‘Chaos’ theory, which was invented by mathematicians and has been widely applied in modern science also, has found its way into the legal arena as well. It provides that even seemingly simple and determinate systems are capable of displaying apparently random and genuinely unpredictable behaviors. In other words, it deals with orderly disorder created by simple processes. The same orderly disorder has also crept into various statutes where multiple authorities have concurrent jurisdiction to decide the same issue and such authorities choose to exercise the same simultaneously, leading to conflicting orders.
However, this issue can be much easily resolved by following the ‘Principle of Comity’. The word comity originates from Latin term ‘Comitas’ which means courtesy. Black’s law dictionary (5th Edition) defines judicial comity as “The principle in accordance with which the courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect.”[1] Consequently, if one officer / authority under the law is already seized of any particular matter, the other authority / officer, though entitled in law to exercise jurisdiction in that matter must refrain from doing so. In Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. v. H.B. Munshi[2], the Supreme Court held that, it refrains from acting under Article 32 of the Constitution if the party has already moved the High Court under Article 226 on account of comity.
In ‘A treatise on Law Governing Injunctions’ by Spelling and Lewis, states that, where a court having jurisdiction has acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter and issued an injunction, a court of concurrent jurisdiction should refuse to interfere by issuance of a second injunction. There is no established rule of exclusion which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction to do so, but it should do so on account of judicial comity. This principle has been followed in India household and healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household and Healthcare Ltd.[3], wherein the Supreme Court noticed that the issue was pending before the Madras High Court and an interim stay was already granted. The Court held that, the doctrine of comity requires a court not to pass an order which would be in conflict with another order passed by a competent court of law thus having a party violate a lawful order passed by another court.
In Sree Sree Bhabapritananda Ojha v. President of The Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts[4], the issue was whether Bihar State Board of Religious Trust could exercise jurisdiction over Baidyanath temple under Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1951, when the temple was regulated by Calcutta High Court under a scheme. The High Court held that such a situation could lead to conflicting orders. There should be as far as possible no conflict or clash of jurisdiction between two equally competent authorities under the principle of comity. It relied on Jopson v. James [5], wherein it was held that the existence of concurrent jurisdiction renders very necessary the observance of comity between those jurisdictions the disregard of which would lead to most unfortunate friction. Two things to be considered in such circumstances are (a) priority in time, and (b) the extent of relief asked for or obtainable in the other jurisdiction.
In Sri Balaji Rice Company v. CTO, Nellore and ors.[6], Petitioner was a registered dealer under AP General Sales Tax Act. For AY 1979-80 and 1980-81, the Petitioner filed returns before CTO No. 1. For AY 1981-82, he filed monthly returns, but no assessment was made. However, in March 1982, CTO No. 2, inspected the premises and sent summons. The High Court held that if a plurality of officers is vested with the power of assessing the same dealer, it will result in great hardship and inconvenience to dealers along with conflicting and contradictory orders.
While examining this issue from the perspective of the Income Tax Act, 1961 the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Shree Digvijay Woolen Mills Ltd.,[7] held that the Income Tax Act in no circumstances could have granted joint jurisdiction to different authorities while providing for concurrent jurisdiction. Generally, when concurrent jurisdiction is conferred, it would be co-extensive. In other words, when one authority takes cognizance of a matter, the other authority is precluded from doing so. Similarly, the Calcutta High Court in Berger Paints India Ltd. And Ors. v. Asst. CIT[8], held that concurrent jurisdiction cannot be construed in such a manner that one part of the assessment can be dealt with by one superior officer and the other part might be dealt with by another subordinate officer.
In Rahman Industries Ltd, Kanpur v. Asst. CIT,[9] the notice was issued by DCIT-6 whereas the assessment order was passed by ACIT-6 without transferring of jurisdiction. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that there can be no joint exercise of concurrent jurisdiction qua one and the same assessment proceedings. ‘Concurrent’, as such is not synonymous with ‘joint’. Lest the decision be rendered chaotic, the invocation of one single jurisdiction is the sine qua non for the valid conclusion of an assessment. ITAT, New Delhi also gave similar findings in Valvoline Cummins Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi v. DCIT [10].
International scenario
The principle of comity is also provided in the Doctrine of Federal-State Courts in Art III, Section 1.6.3 and Section 1.6.7 of the Constitution of the USA. Section 1.6.3 enshrines that Comity is a self-imposed rule of judicial restraint whereby independent tribunals of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction exercise mutual restraint in order to prevent interference with each other and to avoid collusion of authorities.[11] Whereas Section 1.6.7 enshrines abstention doctrine instructing federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction on state laws if a state court’s interpretation of the state law might make resolving a federal constitutional issue unnecessary.
This rule has also been recognized by the US Supreme Court in Kline et al. v. Burke Const. Co.[12] which relied on Covell v. Heyman[13], which states that the forbearance which courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction exercise towards each other, by avoiding interference with the process of each other, is principle of comity, with perhaps no higher sanction than the utility which comes from concord. It is a principle of right and of law and therefore, of necessity. It leaves nothing to discretion or mere convenience. When one takes into its jurisdiction a specific thing, that res is withdrawn from the judicial power of the other. To attempt to seize it by a foreign process is futile and void.
Although, a seemingly straight forward issue, joint exercise of concurrent jurisdiction on the same subject matter has troubled the courts for a long time now. Unlike Principles of Natural Justice which even if not enshrined under the provisions is read into it, it is just a guiding principle. Thus, it is high time that the legislature recognizes the principle of comity in the statutes itself as has been done in Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act and respective SGST Acts which prohibits a proper officer from initiating any proceedings on “the same subject matter” for which proceedings have been initiated by another proper officer thus avoiding any conflicting decisions and hence chaos. This will also prevent the assessees to be subjected to multiple proceedings before multiple officers.
[The authors are Partner, Principal Associate and Senior Associate, respectively, in Commercial Disputes Team at Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan Attorneys]
[1] World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd. v. MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
[2] (1969) 1 SCC 110
[3] (2007) 5 SCC 510
[4] AIR 1954 PATNA 262
[5] (1908) 77 LJ Ch 824 (B)
[6] 1983 SCC OnLine AP 309
[7] (1993) SCC OnLine Guj 325
[8] 2000] 246 ITR 133 (CAL)
[9] MANU/LU/0012/2022
[10] MANU/DE/0801/2008
[11] Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 458, 488 (1900)
[12] 260 US 226
[13] 111 US 176
