The article in this issue of International Trade Amicus discusses an interesting proposition which arose in a recent dispute before the WTO’s DSB in the case United States - Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China (DS543). Relying on Article 12.7 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (‘DSU’), the United States had requested the Panel to not issue findings regarding the tariffs imposed by the United States on certain Chinese imports.
The European Union, like India, follows a lesser duty rule in case of anti-dumping investigations as is ‘desirable’ by the WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Significant distortions methodology on imports from China as per Article 2(6a) of the EU’s amended Basic Regulation has been applied by the European Union in three original anti-dumping investigations.
The article in this issue of International Trade Amicus discusses at length the recently introduced provisions of ‘Significant Distortions Methodology’ by the European Union. The author elaborately analysis the few recent expiry reviews by EU wherein the EU authorities...
To overcome the issue of the alleged expiry of Paragraph 15(a)(ii) of the Chinese Accession Protocol and the probable illegality of the continuation of non-market economy methodology vis-à-vis China, the EU has amended its Basic Anti-dumping Regulation.
The recommendations and rulings of the WTO’s DSB are preferably to be adopted immediately after the concerned country communicates its intentions to implement them. However, if the same is not possible, the country is granted a ‘reasonable period of time’ for such implementation and subsequent compliance.
The article in this issue of International Trade Amicus analysis recent amendments made in the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Antidumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995 in respect of circumvention provisions relating to anti-dumping duty. Circumvention is a mechanism used by companies to ‘avoid’ duties which are targeted against unfair imports.
Finance Bill, 2020 has proposed amendment to the provisions relating to Safeguard duty in order to expand the powers of the Central Government to implement a safeguard measure by the way of a tariff rate quota or any “other safeguard measure” it deems fit. The Tariff Rate Quota regime allows for imports to freely enter the country to fill the demand-supply gap which may exist in the country and on the other hand also protects the domestic industry and its market share by imposing a duty on impor
Article 2.2 of the WTO’s Anti-dumping Agreement allows the investigating authority of a country to reject domestic prices of the exporting country for the purposes of calculating normal value if the domestic sales of the like product do not permit a proper comparison based on certain factors. The article in this issue of International Trade Amicus discusses at length the recent Panel report of the DSB in the dispute involving imposition of anti-dumping duty by Australia on A4 copy paper from Ind
USA’s disinterest in appointing new members to the DSB Appellate Body, has ensured the reduction of the WTO Appellate Body to a single member body. The present article discusses the impact of absence of WTO’s Appellate Body on pending appeals and towards the efficacy of WTO. The author contemplates that the dispute settlement body will continue to work although in the absence of an appellate body, any appeal will render the panel process futile.